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Abstract: Churches often bear the burden of the Internal Revenue
Code's electioneering prohibition without their contributors enjoying
the benefit of a tax deduction. Although contributions to religious
congregations may be deducted, t ►a ►y, perhaps most of them, are not
because many of those who give to churches do not itemize their
income tax deductions. In the past two years, Congress has had before it
several bills that would permit nonite ► izing taxpayers to deduct their
charitable contributions. This Article argues that, extending the
deduction to nonitemizers raises important issues of tax policy that
should concern religious organizations. The author contends that
religious congregations will benefit from considering some of the
difficult questions about the relationship of the charitable contribution
deduction to the standard principles of tax policy. If they do, they might
support either a deduction only above a floor or a charitable
contribution credit rather than a 100% deduction for nonitemizers.
Congress has explained the prohibition on Internal Revenue
Code section 501(c) (3) 1 organizations including churches, from en-
gaging in electioneering2 on the grounds that it "reflects a Congres-
sional policy that the U.S. Treasury should be neutral in political af-
fairs." The variety of exempt organizations that can engage in
electioneering while remaining tax-exempt undermines this ration-
* John E. Anderson Professor of Tax Law and Director, Tax LL.M. Program, Loyola
Law School, Ann Hashisaka,,Jerenty Shortell and Erica .1(mes provided valuable research
assistance.
All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, unless other-
wise indicated.
2 Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal ReVCIIIIC Code requires of the organization as a
condition for exemption that "no substantial part" of its activities consist of "carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation" and that it "not participate
in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any poliiical
campaign on behalf of (or in apposition to) any candidate for public office." I.R.C.
§ 501(c) (3). I shall refer to the fist onidition as a limit on lobbying and the second as a
prohibition on electioneering.
5 H.R. REP, No. 100-391 (II), al 1025, 1027 (1987), reprinted in 1987
2313-1.
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ale.' A more persuasive justification for the prohibition is that Con-
gress did not wish tax-deductible contributions to be used for 'elec-
tioneering activities. As the Supreme Court wrote in the context of
limits on lobbying activities, Congress can refuse to pay for these ac-
tivities "out of public moneys. "5
 That is, the burden of the electioneer-
ing prohibition is the price Congress requires for permitting dona-
tions to section 501 (c) (3) organizations, unlike donations to other
exempt organizations, to be deducted from federal income taxes. 6
Religious organizations depend particularly heavily on charitable
contributions from individual donors. One study reports that in 1996
the total revenue of religious congregations reached $81.2 billion: of
that amount, more than $68.2 billion came from private donations,
94%. of which came from individuals.? A study of 1982 data concluded
that "[al mong the major recipient groups, religious organizations
Section 501(c) (4), (c) (5) and (c) (6) organizations are all exempt from income tax
and can engage in electioneering, so long as it is not their primary activity. I.R.C.
§ 501 (c) (4)—(6). Section 527 organizations are exempt organizations whose very purpose
is to engage in electioneering. I.R.C. § 527. See gruernlly Anne fierrill Carroll, Religion, Poli-
tics, and the IRS: Defining the Limits of Tax Law Controls on Political Expression by Chortles, 76
MARQ. L. REV. 217 (1992).
5
 Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983.. Un-
like section 501 (c) (3) organizations, sections 501(c) (4). (c) (5), (c) (6) and section 527
organizations cannot receive deductible contributions. See1.R.C. §§ 501(c) (3)—(c) (6), 527;
cf. I.R.C. § 170. Courts and commentators have suggested mechanisms to permit charitable
organizations to engage in electioneering with nondeductible money. See Taxation with
Representation, 461 U.S. at 545; see also Branch Islinistries v. Rossotti, 211 1 7.3d 137, 143-44
(D.C. Cir. 2000); Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexis-
tence, 58 GEO. WAsu. L. Ray. 308, 324-26 (1090). Others have questioned whether such
arrangements would be feasible for churches. See Wilfred R. Caron & Deirdre Dessingue,
§ 501(0(3): Practical and Constitutional Implications of "Political" Activity Restrictions, 2
& Put.. 169, 192-93 (1985). See generally Deirdre Dessingue, Prohibition in Search of a
Rationale: Wart the Tax Code Nohibits,.1V1iy; Toll7rat End?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 903 (2001).
6 See STAFF OF JOINT CONIM. ON TAX'N, 1071'11 CONC.., DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF
PRESENT LAW AND PROPOSALS TO EXPAND FEDERAL INCENTIVES FOR CHARITABLE GIVING
(JCX-13-01) 2 (Comm. Print 2001) thereinafter JOINT Corms. ON TAX'N, PRESENT LAW
AND PROPOSALS], available a! hup://www.house.gov/jct/x-13-01.pdf. Section 170 permits
deductions of charitable contributions, subject to percentage limits. In defining "charita-
ble contribution." section 170(c)(2)(D) explicitly refers to the lobbying limitation and
electioneering prohibition. !A.G. § 170(c) (2) (D).
7 See INDEP. SECTOR, AMERICA'S RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS: MEASURING THEIR CON-
TRIBUTION To SOCIETY 4 (2000) thereinafter INuF.P. SECTOR, AMERICA'S RELIGIOUS CON-
GREGATIONS[, available at hup://www.independemsectonorg/programs/research/ Relig-
ionsCong.pdf.
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were most dependent on charitable gifts for support, receiving some
94[%] of all revenues from contributions."8
At the same time, religious gifts have consistently represented the
largest percentage of giving.9 Consider a recent survey from hide-
pendent Sector.1° According to the survey, in 1998, religious organiza-
tions received 60% of total charitable contributions, the largest share
of any category of charitable organizations, as well as the largest aver-
age contribution, $1,002)1, Between 1995 and 1998, the religious or-
ganizations increased both their share of total contributions and the
average amount given per contributing household, although fewer of
those responding reported making contributions to religious organi-
zations.12
In contrast, churches often bear the burden of the electioneering
prohibition without their contributors enjoying the benefit of a tax
deduction. Although contributions to religious congregations are eli-
gible for deduction, many, perhaps most of them, are not in fact de-
ducted. Taxpayers currently choose between taking itemized deduc-
tions and taking the standard deduction.13 Only 30% of taxpayers
itemize their deductions." The benefits of itemizing increase with the
' CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 10-11
(1985). See also BURTON A. WEBBRoo. THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 197 (1988) (reporting
93% of all receipts of religious organizations in 1980 from private giving).
9.SeeCL,OTEELTER, SUpra note 8, at 22.
15 See INt0F.P, SECTOR, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING IN THE UNITED STATES. at Introduc-
tion (1999) [,hereinafter INDIA,. SEcroR, Ct vim: AND VOLUNTEERING], a1 littp://krww.itt-
dependentsector.org/GantIV/s_intr.hon (last visited Aug. 14, 2)101). independent Sector
describes itself as "[al coalition of leading nonprofits, foundations and corporations
strengthening nol-lbrprolit-inniative, philanthropy, and citizen action." See [oily/ /www.
independentsector.org. Independent Sector has made passing the deduction for tionitem-
izers its top legislative priority, and has more iltati 500 organizations as signatories to a
letter supporting this legislation. See http://www.independentsector.org/inedia/ Testinto-
nylltlintil (last visited Aug. 14, 2001); Ititp://ww•independentsector.org/progrants/gr/
NCILstipitorters.honl (last visited Aug. 14, 2001). It also conducts mid sponsors many
reseinch projects regarding the non-prolit sector, hit:lading surveys that have been con-
ditctel over many years, and I will he using much of its material in the pages that follow.
See I al eper 'den ised or.org/ progra ins/ research/resca rch .hint I (last visited
Aug. 14, 2001).
II !Nom. SEcToR, GtvING AND VOLUNTEERING, Sttpia Dole 10. at Household Contribu-
tions by `Type and Cl unity.
12 Id. 'flit percentage making such contributions fell from 48% in 1995 to 45% in
1998. Id.
Section 63(c) defines the standard dednetion and section 63(e) provides an election
to itemize.	 § 63(c), (c),
11 See Charles T. Clotleher & Richard L. Schmalbeck, The Impart of Fundamental Mx Be,.
form on Nonprofit Organizations, in ECONOMIc EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 228
(Henry.). Aaron & C. Gale eds., 1990); Joseph Cordes et al. Extending the Charita-
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level of taxable income; the value of taking a one-dollar charitable
contribution deduction saves taxpayers from 15 cents to almost 40
cents in federal taxes, depending on their marginal rate. For a tax-
payer at the 15% marginal tax rate who deducts $1.00 of charitable
contributions, the after-tax cost of the contribution is 85 cents; for a
taxpayer at a 40% marginal rate, the after-tax cost is only 60 cents.. For
taxpayers who take the standard deduction, in contrast, the after-tax
cost of a $1.00 charitable contribution is the same as its before-tax
cost—$1.00. Itemization, naturally, rises with income, and lower
bracket taxpayers are less likely to itemize.
Lower-income taxpayers, those taxpayers least likely to itemize,
are also the taxpayers who favor religious organizations in making
their charitable contributions. 15 Direct data on the magnitude of
charitable contributions by nonitemizers are generally not available. 16
Charles T. Clotfelter and Richard L. SalinaMeek, with caution' and
caveats, recently made estimates for nonitemizers based on simula-
tions and data from 1986, the one year in which nonitemizers were
permittecl to fully deduct their charitable contributions. Based on
these simulations, they conclude: "Contributions to religious organi-
zations constituted over three-fourths of contributions from taxpayers
with incomes below $40,000. At the highest income levels, gifts to col-
leges and universities, hospitals, and arts and cultural organizations
account for a much larger share of gifts."17 In the 1970s, Boris Biitker
similarly observed that the information available supported the hy-
pothesis that "gifts by low-income taxpayers go primarily to the
churches of which they are themselves members."18
In the past two years, Congress has had before it several bills that
would permit tionitemizers to deduct their charitable contribtition
deductions, bills which differ in their structures and specifics.'° Al-
ble
	 lo A7aniteatizers: Policy Issues and Options, in CHARTING CIVIL SOCIETY 6 (The
Urban Inst./Car. on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, Wash., D.C.) May 2000, available at
littp://www.urban.org/pericalcl/cnp/rnp7.pdf; INDEI'. SECTOR, GU/DING PRINCIPLE.i FOR
PUBLIC POLICY ON CHARITABLE GIVING 5 (Mar. 2001)   [hereinafter INDEP. SECTOR, GUM-
ING PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.indepentlentsector.org/prograins/gr/  Guiding-
Principles.pdf.
16 See CLOTFELTER, Stip/WI -IOW 8, al 23, 283.
111 SeejOINT COMAE. ON r IAX . N, PRESENT LAW AND PROPOSALS, 5tipra note 6, al 16. •
17 Clot leiter & Schntalbeck,.sapra nine 14, at 215.
18 Boris I. [linker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants, 28 T•kx L.
REV. 37, 55 (1972).
19
	 Neighbor to Neighbor Art, HR. 824, 1071h Cong. (2001); Charitable Giving Tax
Relit-4'Am H.R. 777, 107th Cong. (2001); JoiNT COMM. ON TAX'N, PRESENT LAW AND PRO-
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though such a change would not affect the burden of the electioneer-
ing prohibition, we would expect churches to welcome enthusiasti-
cally a change that would expand the benefit of deducting charitable
contributions. As Clotfelter wrote in his classic 1985 study,
"[p] rovisions that affect giving at lower incomes tend to have their
major effect on religious groups," and the nonitemizer deduction
would primarily affect those in lower income groups, who are less
likely to itemize. 20
This Article, however, argues that extending the charitable con-
tribution deduction to nonitemizers raises important issues of tax pol-
icy that should concern churches and other religious organizations.
Part I reviews the history of the charitable contribution deduction
and of the standard deduction. Part II reviews the tax policy issues
raised by extending the deduction to nonitemizers. Specifically, it
comiders the proposed legislative changes in light of both the
efficiency and the equity justifications of the charitable contribution
deduction, in light of the possible impact on the level of volunteering
in the charitable sector, and in light of administrative concerns.
Churches and religious organizations may well differ in how they
view the policy justifications for the charitable contribution deduc-
tion. These differences, in turn, should influence which form of legis-
lation for extending the charitable contribution deduction they would
favor. In fact, religious groups most concerned about the lobbying
limitation and electioneering prohibitions in the tax code, because of
a strong commitment to social action and an equitable society, might
find the charitable contribution deduction inconsistent with the very
beliefs they would like to advocate. Another—albeit, I am sure unwel-
come—inference from this review of the various arguments and ra-
tionales regarding the charitable contribution deduction is that it
would be appropriate to place religious organizations in a special
category of charities not eligible for the charitable contribution de-
duction. Some solace from this conclusion would be that perhaps un-
der such a scheme, the prohibition on electioneering also would be
no longer applicable.°
l'OSAIS, SIOprfl	 at 7-11 (reviewing 2001 Senate proposals to expand the federal tax
benefits to charitable giving).
2° CunTELTER, supra note 8, at 129-32. (lonelier has estimated that extending the
charitable contribution deduction to nonitemizers stun increase long-run giving to relig-
ious organizations hp 14%, in contrast to an increase of 8% for higher educational institu-
tions. Id. at 131 0)1.3.10,
21 See generally Dessingne, MIMI note 5.
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Religious congregations, I believe, will benefit from considering
some of the difficult questions and giving themselves thoughtful an-
swers about the relationship of the charitable contribution deduction
to the standard principles of tax policy. In turn, the treatment of relig-
ious congregations makes us rethink these standard principles of tax
policy.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION DEDUCTION AND
THE STANDARD DEDUCTION
A. War Revenue Act of 1917
The deduction for charitable contributions is one of the oldest
deduction provisions in the tax laws. Although an attempt to enact a
deduction for gifts to "religious, charitable, scientific, or educational"
institutions in 1913 was unsuccessful, 22
 such a provision was included
in the War Revenue Act of 1917. 23
 It provided a deduction for: •
Contributions or gifts actually made within the year to cor-
porations or associations organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes,
or to societies for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals, no part of the net income of which inures to the
benefit of any private stockholder or individual, to an
amount not in excess of fifteen per centum of the taxpayer's ,
taxable net income as computed without the benefit of this .
paragraph. Such contributions or gifts shall be allowable as'
deductions only if verified under rules and regulations pre-
scribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the'
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury. 24
242 See .I.S. SEIDNIAN, SEIDNIAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ruE FEDERAL INCOMI TAX
LAWS 1938-1861, at 945 (1938).
23 See War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).
2.1
 M. The percentage limits were increased from lime to Iiine 1111111 they reached the
current limits, which bw churches awl other specified organizations is 50% of the individ-
ual's adjusted gross inutiine for gifts of cash and ordinary income property. See i.R.C.
I 70(b) (1) (A). Since those who currently lake the standard deduction are unlikely to he
concerned about the percentage limits, I will not discuss them further in any detail. Al-
though Clotfelter observes that "households earning a relatively small portion of total
income account for a disproportionate share of contributions" and ilmt "households con-
tributing more than 20 percent of their income accounted for about 11 percent of income
but over 60 percent of all contribution," he dues not suggest that such households ap-
proach the 50% limit. See CLOTFELTER. MIMI note 8. at 20.
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The 1917 Act levied taxes only on incomes above $68,680 in 2001 dol-
lars and applied a tax rate of 15% only for net incomes above
$546,528 in 2001 dollars. 25
Legislative history indicates that this provision was prompted by
the concern that without a deduction, wealthy taxpayers subject to
these levels of taxation would no longer contribute to institutions of
higher learning. 2G Senator Hollis, for example, explained that the
country had permitted institutions of higher learning "to grow up
and becOme firmly established on the plan of depending upon private
contributions."27 He feared that the war would affect colleges "more
seriously than it does any other character of institution," both by tak-
ing its students from them to be soldiers and by reducing its financial
support. 28 He continued:
Usually people contribute to charities and educational ob-
jects out of their surplus. After they have clone everything
else they want to do, after they have educated their children
and traveled and spent their money on everything they really
want or think they want, then, if they have something left
over, they will contribute it to a college or to the Red Cross
or for some scientific purposes. Now, when war conies, .
that will be the first place where wealthy men will be tempted
to economize, namely, in donations to charity. 29
Senator Hollis made no mention of religious organizations, although
some of the editorials and letters he submitted for the record did so."
The charitable contribution deduction has remained part of the
Internal Revenue Code ever since, with the percentage of adjusted
gross income that can be deducted as charitable contributions in a
single year eventually being raised to 50% for churches and other
public charities for contributions of cash and ordinary income prop-
e rty. 31
23 See CLOTFEI.TER, Stipro Rote 8, at 3l (1917 dollar amounts are adjusted for inflation).




See id. at 6728-29.
31 See I.R.C. § 170(h) (I) (as amended by the Tax Refin•n Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
172, ,§ 201 (a) (1) (11), 83 Stat. 487, 549-51). The legislative history explains that the reason
finr raising the limit from 30% to 50% was to "strengthen the incentive effect of die Chari-
table contributions 41c:dm:lion." STAFF oF: joINT COMM. oN TAx*N, 91s• CONG., GENERAL.
EXPLi,NXIION or Tor: fAx REFORM OE 19641 (1CX-I6-70) 75 (Comm. Print 1970).
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B. Individual Income Tax Act of 1944
While World War I gave rise to the charitable contribution de-
duction, World War II prompted the standard deduction, which was
introduced in 1944. With World War II, Congress extended the in-
come tax enormously. Between 1939 and 1945, the coverage of the tax
system grew from about 5% to 74% of the population. 32 Particularly as
a result of a reduction in the personal exemption, Congress antici-
pated a large increase in tax return filers." Congress enacted the
standard deduction to simplify tax return filing." The House Report
explained that the intent of the Individual Income Tax Act of 194-4
was "confined to simplification of the individual income tax" with
three objectives: '-'[t]o relieve the great majority of taxpayers from the
necessity of computing their income tax ... [t]o reduce the number
of tax computations .. . [and] [t]o simplify the return form."35 Ac-
cording to the Senate Report, "[t]he standard deduction is in lieu of
the nonbusiness deductions and certain credits against net income
and against tax" so that a taxpayer "is not required to itemize and sub-
stantiate his nonbusiness deductions."36
The impact of a new standard deduction on charities received
considerable attention. Churches and other nonprofit groups actively
opposed the provision, seeing it as a threat to their continued exis-
tence. 37 Representative Carl Curtis, the congressman most concerned
about the provision's effect on charities, made both of the basic ar-
guments regarding the justification for the charitable contribution:
the argument for fairness or equity, and the argument for efficiency
or the incentive effect. 38
 He seemed most disturbed about inequitable
treatment. 39
 In his view, the legislation treated two differently situated
taxpayers as if they were in the same position. He worried that the bill,
33 See Alan L. Feld, Fairness in Rate Cats in the individual Income Mx, 68 ColuvELL L. REV.
429,433-34 (1983).
" See id. al 438-19.
31 See id, at 439-40.
35 [LB. REP. No. 78-1365, reprinted in 1944 C.B. 821 (1944).
S. REP. No. 78-885, reprinted in 1944 C.B. 858, 8C10 (1944).
37 See 90 CONC.. RF.c.. 4029 (1944) (noting the objection of United Stewardship Council
representing twenty-one Protestant church members, the Council on Taxes and Philan-
thropy, a number of Catholic Churches and organizations, and the American Association
of Colleges); CLO'ITELTER, supra note 8, at 32 (citing articles from the New York Times from
December of 1943 to December 1945); C. HARRY KAHN, PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS IN THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 4(1 (1960).
38 See90 CONC.. REC. 3072-73,4028-30 (1944).
38 See id. at 3972-73,
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when carried into effect, meant that the individual who gives a por-
tion of his hard-earned money in contributions would have the same
amount of his taxes "withheld from his wages as if lie had given noth-
ing."40 Charitable organizations objected to the bill, he argued, be-
cause of the belief that "everybody, regardless of whether they give a
nickel, is entitled to a blanket deduction."'" The bill's approach, he
believed, erred fundamentally:
It has been the basic policy in America that our tax program
is one that considers a gift to the U.S.O., the Red Cross, a
children's home, a hospital, a home for the aged, a college, a
mission, a church, or any other institution rendering service
and mercy, an expenditure for the public good, and, there-
fore exempt from taxation.42
Representative Curtis also argued that this change would "cripple all
of these worth-while [sic] institutions so that they must conic to the
Federal Government for a subsidy." 43
Proponents of the bill rejected these arguments. To them, the
need for simplification was far greater than any equitable argument
and they also rejected the incentive argument. Representative Robert-
son, for example, responded that although the members of the com-
mittee considered Representative Curtis' viewpoint, they "found it
absOlutely impossible to work out this simplification plan on any basis
other than what we [have] used."44 More fundamentally, they rejected
the need for the deduction as an incentive to giving, at least for those
at the lower income levels who would make use of the standard de-
duction.* Representative Robert L. Doughton, then chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, expressed a belief that contribu-
tions were made not "for the purpose of securing a tax reduction, but
because of the worthy causes such contributions advance." 46 Senator
Walter F. George, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, spoke
even more forcefully:
The committee does not believe that it can be proved that a
tax incentive has been an important factor in the making of
1° Id. at 3972.
41 1d,
42 Id. at 4029.
4:1 90 Coro:. Rue. 4029 (1944).
14 Id. at 3973.
45 Id, at 3975-76.
46 Id. am 3975; see also KAHN, SUPM note 37, at 46-47.
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such gifts by individuals having less than $5,000 of adjusted
gross income, and certainly the $500 standard deduction will
not remove the tax incentive for persons in the higher
brackets, upon whom the charities depend for contributions
in substantial amounts. ►7
Moreover, proponents felt that in setting the standard deduction they
had taken account of the average charitable contribution of two and a
half percent."
C. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
In 1981, however, Congress was persuaded to allow nonitemizers
to deduct charitable contributions, at least in part and at least mail
1986, when Congress was to study the effect of the provision. ►  The
Treasury Department objected to the provision. Donald Lubick, Assis-
tant Secretary for Tax Policy, argued that inflation, not the standard
deduction, constituted the greatest threat to giving in the voluntary
secton 50
 Assistant Secretary Lubick further argued that those with
lower incomes respond less to a tax break because of their low
bracket, that giving seems to be primarily a function of personal in-
come, and that the revenue loss would go to those already making
gifts rather than creating new gifts. 51
Congress, after hearing elaborate testimony about price elasticity
at lower income levels from both Martin Feldstein and Charles Clot-
fetter, disagreed. 52
 According to the Joint Committee on Taxation,
"Nhe Congress believed that allowing a charitable deduction to non-
itemizers stimulates charitable giving, thereby providing more fiuncls
for worthwhile nonprofit organizations, many of which provide serv-
17 90 CONG. REC. 4704 (1944): see also KAI IN, supra note 37, at 47.
91) CONG. REC. 3973 (1944) (statement of Rep. Robertson).
19 See Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 121, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
The provision as passed phased in the deduction with 100% of charitable contribution
deductions to be permitted for nonitemizers only in 1986, and termination of the'provi-
sion after 1986, "so that the On -Tress will have I he uhporu lniI to review its effectiveness in
stimulating contrilmitions and any administrative problmns it may have caused." STAFF OF
JOINT COMET. ON TAx•N, 97T11 CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECON'-
ERY TAX ACT OF 1981 (JCS-71-81) 49 (Comm. Print 1981) (hereinafter Jolicr COMM. ON
TAX'N, 1981 ACTT.
'5'1
 See Charitable Co n tribution Deductions: Healing on S. 219 Before the Senate Subcomn. on
Tax'a and Debt Med. Generally of the Comm. on Finance. 96th Cong. 51 (1980).
51 See id. at 52-53.
52 See id. at 217-35.
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ices that otherwise might have to be provided by the Federal Gov-
ernment."53
D. Tax Reform Act of 1986
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 did not continue the charitable con-
tribution deduction for nonitemizers. As one lawyer who specializes in
representing exempt organizations commented, "Wile big idea of the
'86 Act was to pare away deductions and credits to broaden the base
so you could bring the top rates down. . . And that was a pretty pow-
erful tide and the nonitemizer [deduction] just wasn't strong enough
to swim against that current."54 In 1986, as in 1944, simplification of
the tax code was a key goal, and the standard deduction helped to
achieve that goal. In the 1986 Act, Congress sought a simpler system
for individuals. Beginning in 1988, the Act established two individual
income tax rates-15% and 28%—to replace more than a dozen tax
rates in each of the prior-law rate schedules, which extended up to
50%. Significant increases in the standard deduction and
modifications to certain personal deductions provided further siin-
plicity by greatly reducing the number of taxpayers who would itemize
their deductions:55
Simplification and base-broadening were far more important
than incentives for charitable giving.56 Reducing the top individual
rates, for example, lowered the incentive for making charitable gifts,
by raising the after-tax cost of contributions. 57 As intended, the 1986
55 JOINT COMM. ON TAX' N, 1981 A•r, supra !Note 49, at 49.
at Fred Stokeld, Should Norritemizos Gel the Charitable Deduction?. 76 TAN NOTES 157. 160
(1997) (alteration in original) ((limning Robert A. lloisture, exempt organization tax law
sirecialist with Caplin & Drysdale. Wasliinguni, Dr.).
.See STAFF OF JO/NT COMM. ON TA X'N, 1001111 CONG., GENERAL. Ex PLANATION OF TIIE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 6 (Comm. Print 1987),
116 See &madl Roinuld A. Pearlman, Repeal of Charitable Contributiort,s. for Non iternizer.s Ex-
plained, 28 Ttx NOTES 1140 (1985) (emphasizing administrative burdens for both 1RS and
taxpayers).
57 CI Lades Clone her has written:
As debate over lax re1O1'm intensified (hiring the 1980s, influential spokesper-
sons for nonprofit organizations came to view such refOrni as it serious threat
to that source of revenue, a view that was bolstered by economic models of
charitable giving, Finding it uncomfortable to oppose tax refOrm itself, the
nonprofits nevertheless fought to maintain lax incentives for giving, with the
result_ that the treatment of charitable contributions provided sonic of the
gloomiest predictions and most heated debate among the provisions involved
in tax reform during the 1980s.
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Tax Reform Act increased the number of taxpayers taking the stan-
dard deduction. 58
E. Current Proposals
Now the tide may have turnecl again. Voices from both parties
proclaim the need to permit nonitemizers to deduct charitable con-
tributions. President Clinton's Fiscal 2001 Budget Proposal included a
provision permitting nonitemizers to deduct 50% of their charitable
contributions above certain floors." President Bush in his Agenda for
Tax Relief also called for expanding the federal charitable deduction
to nonitemizers." On February 28, 2001, Representative Philip Crane
introduced the Charitable Giving Tax Relief Act to permit nonitemiz-
ers to deduct 100% of their charitable contributions up to the amount
of the standard deduction. 61
Proponents justify these proposals by looking primarily to the
incentive effects. A Clinton White House press release noted that
lower-income nonitemizers "cannot get the tax incentive for charita-
ble giving that higher-income itemizers can claim."62
 President Bush's
Tax Agenda states that the President wants to expand the deduction
"to encourage an outpouring of giving," and notes that this change
Charles Clotfelter, The Impact of Tax Reform on Charitable Giving: A 1989 Perspective, in Do
'PARES MATTER? THE IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 198(1, Al 203 ( Joel Slentro41 ed.,
1990).
58 See MicttAEL J. GRAETz & DEBORAH	 SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOSIE TAXATION 428-29
(3d ed. 1995) (observing that the:1986 Act was praised for decreasing the number of item-
izers); IRS INDIVIDUAL INCOME mu( RETURNS 1988, at 2 (1991) (showing that the number
of taxpayers who itemized deductions decreased by 20% front 1985 to 1988).
" See treasury Explains Clinton Budget Revenue Proposals, 2000 TNT 27-26 (Feb. 9, 2000),
available at FEDTAX; TNT, LEXIS; see also STAFF OFJOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, I 06T11 CONC..,
SUMMARY OF TAX PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2001 BUDGET
PROPOSAL (JCX-13-00) 17 (Comm. Print 2000), available a! lutp://www.lionse,gov/jct/x-
13-00.pdh Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year
2001, at 66, available at lutp://www.access.gpo.gov/tisbudgetify2001:
 DEVI . oF THE
TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2001 REVENUE
PROPOSALS 110 (Feb. 2000), available at luip://www.treas.gov/taxpolicy/library/grubk00 .
pdf.
ro See President's Agenda for Tax Relief, at 4. available at lutp://www.whitehottse.gov/
news/reports/taxplan.litml (last visited Aug. 15, 2001).
61
 Charitable Giving Relief Act, H.R. 777,10711t Cong. (200 l ).
▪ Press Release, White House, President Clinton's Tax Agenda for Community, Op-
portunity, and Responsibility, 2000 TNT 19-16,( Jan. 27, 2000) available at FEDTAX; TNT,
LEXIS.
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"will generate billions of dollars annually in additional charitable con-
tributions."63 Representative Crane explains:
Non-itemizers are predominantly low- and middle-hicome
taxpayers who as a group give generously to charitable
causes. However, lacking a specific deduction for their chari-
table contributions, there can be no question that they face a
disincentive to making charitable contributions relative to
itemizers, who tend to be upper-middle-hicome and upper-
income taxpayers. This certainly appears unfair. But, more
importantly, it means charitable organizations supported
predominantly by lower-income individuals are even more
strapped for financial support than they need be. For exam-
ple, churches serving lower-income communities have fewer
resources to address the needs of their congregations as a re-
sult of this disincentive.. . . Charity is thus a blessed act that
should suffer no discouragement from something so mean
as the tax code, 64
Among these government policymakers, only Representative Crane
mentions the argument about fairness or equity.
For other proponents of the charitable contribution deduction
for nonitemizers, however, the fairness argument is as important as
the incentive argument. Independent Sector, for example, in its Guid-
ing Principles for Public Policy on 'Charitable Giving, includes a paragraph
advocating the need for an incentive for nonitemizers with the follow-
ing:
Individuals giving to charity are foregoing private consump-
tion and voluntarily committing the donated resources to
the public good. For income tax purposes, the donor's in-
come net of the gift—that is, the income available for private
consumption—represents a much fairer basis than pre-gift
income for determining the donor's tax obligation. As such,
charitable giving should not be considered as part of an in-
dividual's tax base.65
The next part of this Article considers in more detail these two
categories of justification for the charitable contribudons deduction
63 President's Agenda, supra nole 60, at 4.
6 ' 1 147 CoNkl. RINI. F.2411-14 (2001).
INDEP. SECTOR, GUIDING PRINCIPLES, supra now 14, at 5.
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and the implications for churches in particular of extending it to non-
itemizers.
II. POLICY RATIONALES FOR THE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION
DEDUCTION
A. Deduction as an Incentive: The Argument from Efficiency
As noted above, governmental officials, whether Republican or
Democrat, whether in the legislative or executive branches, have sup-
ported extending the charitable contribution deduction to nonitein-
izers as a means of encouraging charitable giving. That is, they view
the deduction as an incentive. 66
 Implicit in this position is the belief
that the charitable contribution deduction is "dollar-efficient" because
the "charitable organizations receive more in donations than the
Treasury loses in revenue clue to a tax policy change." 67 In other
words, policymakers do not look solely to increases in charitable giv-
ing. They compare any predicted increase with the predicted loss in
government revenue. Whether the increased giving is greater than
the revenue loss depends on how much charitable contributions are
sensitive to changes in price. The assumption is that, because the
permitted deduction lowers the price of the contribution, taxpayers
will give more when the price is lower. In economic terms, the ques-
tion of sensitivity to changes in the after-tax cost of making a charita-
ble contribution is one of price elasticity. The efficiency argument,
however, also requires consideration of administrative concerns, of
the effect on volunteering, and of economic efficiency.
66
 Roth the Treasury Department and the joint Committee on Taxation tre;at the
charitable contribution deduction as a tax expetnliffire, a provision "analogous to direct
outlay programs," and thus as a subsidy. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 107Th
CONG., EsTiimATEs of FEDERAL. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FtsCAL YEARS 2001-2005 ( JCS-1—
01) 2-1 (Comm. Print 2001), available at http://www.house.gov/jci/s-I-0 LIME joint
Committee on Taxation estimates the tax expenditure in 2001 for charitable contribittions
by individuals at $29.7 billion. Id. at 20-23 0)1.1 (adding figures for charitable contribu-
tions to educational institutions, charitable contributions to health organizations, and
deductions for charitable contributions, other than to educational awl health organiza-
tions); see id. at 25 tb1.3
67
 Don Fullerton & Shim D. Goodman, The Economic Recovmy Tax Act of 1981: Implica-
tions for Charitable Giving, 16 Tax NoTEs 1027, 1028 (1082). Similarly, Independent Sector
in its Guiding Thinmples for Public Polio' on Charitable Giving defines efficiency In this con-
text" as "stimulating increased charitable giving with as little lax revenue kiss to the Treas-
ury as possible." INDEr. SECTOR, GUIDING PRINCIPLES. st/pR7 note 14, at 6.
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1. Evidence on Elasticity
Many economists have studied the elasticity of charitable contri-
butions. As the Joint Committee on Taxation recently explained, "the
preponderance of evidence suggests that the charitable contribution
deduction has been a stimulant to charitable giving, at least for higher
income individuals."68 These studies, however, differ considerably in
the level of sensitivity of taxpayer response reported.° According to
one review of the literature: '
The middle to high end of the range of estimated responses
'suggests that increasing (decreasing) the cost of giving by 10
-
percent decreases (increases) contributions by at least 10
percent. The lower end of the range implies considerably
more modest responses with a (permanent) 10 percent in-
crease (decrease) in the cost of giving leading to only a 3
percent decrease (increase) in contribution."
One proponent of the lower end of the range has argued that earlier
studies confused timing effects with permanent effects and suggested
that, on a permanent basis, charitable contributions do not exhibit as
much price elasticity as previously believed.'"
Moreover, the price elasticity of those who do not itemize is even
more uncertain. As the Joint Committee on Taxation has noted,
"[i]nferences drawn from such. [existing] studies may be inappropri-
ate when applied to [the lower-income] taxpayers who currently claim
the standard deduction."'" Some studies suggest that lower-income
taxpayers are less responsive to price incentives than higher-income
taxpayers, and that for these taxpayers, their level of income
influences charitable giving more than the price of the charitable
68 Jol NT COMM. ON TAX 'N, PRESENT LAW AND PROPOSALS, .suppa note 6, at 14. Martin
Feldstein's work has been particularly influential. See generally Nlartin Feldstein, The Income
Tax and Charitable Contributions: Par! I—Aggregate and Distributional Lffrets, 28 Nset, TAx J.
81 (11175); Martin Feldstein, The Income 'nix and Charitable Contributions: Part II—The Impact
on Rergious. Educational and Other Organizations, 28 NAT'L TAx. J. 209 (1975); Marlin Feld-
stein A: Charles Clotidter. Ince»lives and Charitable Contributions in the United States, 5 J.
OF Pun. ECON. 5 (1976).
6'*1 Evelyn Brody & Joseph J. Cordes, 'Mx Thatment of Nonprofit thganizations: A Two-
Edged Sword, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT 141, 146
(Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 1999).
7° Id. at 146.
See William C. Randolph. Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes, and the Timing of Charitable
Cuntributions,103 J. or Pot,. ECON, 709, 710-11 (1995).
72 JOINT COMM. ON TAX . N, PREsENT LAW AND PROPOSALS, supra note 6, :11 14.
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contribution. 73
 Along these lines, Clotfelter and Schmalbeck write
that "high-income-elasticity, low-price-elasticity estimates perform bet-
ter for income classes below $100,000." 74
 Other studies have taken the
opposite position and argued that lower-income taxpayers are price-
sensitive. 75
Because of the data on which they must rely and the assumptions
that they must make, none of these studies provides clear answers.
Independent Sector, for example, as strong evidence for its support
for extending the charitable contribution to nonitemizers, cites a
study it commissioned from PricewaterhouseCoopers. This study' con-
cludes that extending the charitable contribution deduction to non-
itemizers would stimulate an 11.19% increase in charitable giving and
stimulate eleven million new givers, with the greatest in percentage
terms coining from the $20,000—$30,000 income tax bracket. 76 De-
spite these results, the methodology used in the study urges cantion
about its conclusions. Its model is based on the 1994 Public Use Tax
File issued by the Internal Revenue Service, which includes informa-
tion on 96,000 tax returns. 77
 The study, however, had to impute in-
formation about giving by nonitemizers, because such information
does not appear on 1994 tax returns. To make this imputation, Price-
waterhouseCoopers used "characteristics of nonitemizers as disclosed
on tax returns in 1986, the last year that they could fully deduct chari-
table contributions under prior law."78
 This statement could be 'read
to suggest that PricewaterhouseCoopers had many years with data re-
garding the nonitemizer deduction from which to choOse for its
model.
In fact, 1986 was the only year in which nonitemizers could • fully
deduct their charitable contributions since the standard deduction
was introduced. Moreover, there are many reasons to believe that the
75 See Charles T Cloth:her & Eugene Steuerle, Charitable Contributions, in How TAXES
AFFECT ECONOMIC REHAN'l OR 403, 436-37 (Henry J. Anion & Joseph A. Pechman eds.,
1981): Christopher M. Duquette, Is Charitable Giving by Nonitemizers Responsive to Tax Incen-
tives? New Evidence, 52 NAT'L TAx J. 195, 203-04 (1999).
74 Clotfater & Schinalbeck. .SUPril note 14, al 22(1.
7,5
	 V011g S. Choe & jinook jeong. Charitable Contributions- by Low- and Middle-Income
Taxpayers: Further Evidence with a New Method. 41i NAT'L TA X. J. 3 3 (1993); Charles T. Clodel-
ter, lax-Induced Distortions ire the l3lnntary Sector, 39 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 663, 685-86
(1989).
76
 PRICEWATERIIOUSECOOPERS, INEENrIVES FOR NONITEM FIE RS To Gm: MORE: AN




July 2001]	 Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction	 859
1986 data are not representative. Giving in general surged in 1986,
possibly in anticipation of many changes to the tax code that year that
made giving, more expensive after-tax, such as the end of the nonitem-
ized deduction and the lowering of tax rates." Nonitemizers might
have overstated their deductions and some might have switched from
itemizing for that one year only, because of the one-time ability to
take both the standard deduction and all charitable contributions. 80
To be fair, other considerations suggest that the 1986 figures are un-
derstated: individuals might lag behind tax changes and individuals
new to the need for keeping records of charitable contributions may
have understated their giving. In any case, relying on just one year's
data is problematic. As discussed in greater detail below, the Urban
Institute, using a charitable giving model similar to that of .Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers and 1995 income levels, produces much lower
numbers. 81 •
•.Using the PricewaterhouseCoopers study, Independent Sector
concludes that the cost to the Treasury would be $75 billion and the
increase in giving would be "on the order of $160 billion."82 Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers, however, did not estimate the lost government
revenue; the figure Independent Sector used was that of the Joint
Committee on Taxation. The gains in contributions and the losses in
revenue were not computed using the same methods or data and may
not, therefore, be comparable.
Of course, religious organizations are particularly interested in
price and income elasticity of gifts to religious organizations, Some
studies have in fact found that religious giving reflects large price elas-
ticity; others have found the opposite." Thus, the incentive argument
that dominates the public debate about extending the charitable con-
tribution deduction is possible but not proven.
2. Adding Administrative Concerns to the Mix
Even if the case was proven, competing concerns tntist also be
considered. Any change in tax policy must take into account adminis-
trability, from the point of view of both the government and the tax-
i
79 See JOINT COMM -. ON IAX'N, PRESENT LAW' AND PROPOSALS, SUM note 6, at 17 11.35
(commenting on high level of donations in 1986); Clotfeher, supra note 57, at 203;
Randolph, supra note 71, at 710-11.
H° See Clotfelter & Schmalbeck, supra note 14, at 238-39.
81 See infra text accompanying notes 84-92.
82 See PRIGEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, sn/na note 76, tit 4.
83 See CLOTFELTER, supra note 8, at 64--65 (comparing studies).
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payer, considering the potential for gaming of the system, cheating,
and the burdens of compliance. Inaccurate reporting of charitable
contribution deductions is a continuing and, in the aggregate, a
significant problem for the tax .
 system. The Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion noted:
Evidence from audits and in taxpayer compliance studies es-
tablishes that many .taxpayers overstate their actual charita-
ble contributions when claiming itemized deductions. . .
Moreover, experience with taxpayers who itemize suggestS
that, if nonitemizers were allowed to claim a deduction for
their charitable contributions, many nonitemizers would alsci
overstate their actual charitable contributions for the pur-
poses of claiming a tax beiiefit. 84
This is a real problem. The Independent Sector has stated that rules
requiring substantiation from the charity for gifts of $250 or more as
well as other existing safeguards "have effectively ensured the integrity
of the exiting charitable contribution deduction,"85
 but these safe-
guards do not sufficiently address the issue of overstating small gifts.
To protect against this 'waste, nonitemizers would have to keep rec-
ords of their charitable deductions, incurring administrative costs for
the taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service alike, burdens that
led to the standard deduction in 1944 and its expansion in 1986. Tax
policymakers must be confident that benefits outweigh additional
administrative complexity.
Special concerns arise as a result of the choice to itemize or not.
Ironically, extending the charitable contribution deduction for non-
itemizers could bestow a windfall on itemizers who can reduce (heir
tax liability without increasing their giving. As Joseph Cordes, John
O'Hare and Eugene Steuerle of the Urban Institute explain:
Suppose that the standard deduction is $6,000 and that a
household has itemized deductions of $7,000, $2,000 of
which are charitable .contributions. If all charitable contribu-
tions were deductible by nonitemizers, then the individual'
could take a $2,000 charitable deduction and a standard de-,
84 30INT COMM. ON TAX'N, PRESENT LAW AND PROPOSALS, supra note 6, al 17.
85
 Statement of Peter Goldberg and Sara E. Melendez, submitted on behalf of Inde-
pendent Sector to the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives,
February 27, 2001, available at hitp://www.independentsector.org/ntedia/TestimonyPR.
hall (last visited Aug. 15, 200 k )..
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ductio ► of $6,000, thus increasing total deductions by $1,000
to $8,000. If the taxpayer were in the 28% tax bracket, the
$1,000 increase in total deductions would result in tax sav-
ings (revenue cost) of just under $300 without change to the
financial incentive to give (except to the extent that the tax-
payer had somewhat more after-tax income)."
That is, a proposal to permit nonitentizers to deduct all charita-
ble contributions introduces a concern about those taxpayers who
switch to decrease their tax liability, but do not increase their giving. 87
These authors note it is possible to design a charitable contribution
deduction for no ► itemizers that significantly increases charitable giv-
ing at little or even no tax revenue while also addressing concerns
about administration and compliance, and they recommend permit-
ting both itemizers and noniteinizers to deduct charitable contribu-
tions only above a floor. 88 According to the authors, who ran their
models under several ranges of price elasticity, such a floor would re-
duce the ability to claim hard-to-document contributions (along with
the need to document them and the IRS to audit them), reduce reve-
nue loss, provide more of a subsidy to extra giving, and achieve con-
sistent treatment of charitable deductions for itemizers and nonitem-
izers. This approach, as the authors admit, would raise the tax bills of
itemizers."
At one time, some representatives of nonprofit groups supported
the idea of a floor for at least ►o ► itemizer charitable contribution de-
as Cordes et al., supra note 14, at 2.
a? See id.
See d. at 3. They snggest either a floor of $500 fur joint filers and a floor of $250 for
single tilers or floors of $050 and $325, respectively. See id. For the former. die increased
giving is greater than the revenue loss; the latter is revenue neutral. See id. at 4. Although
the thinui Ittstitute Study describes itself as using a model of charitable giving quite similar
to the model used by PricewaterhouseCoopers for Independent Sector, their colulusions
contrast sharply. See PRICEWA•ERIIOUSECOOPERS, ,mjna 110le 76, at 4-5. The Urban Institute
study found that revenue loss exceeded the change in giving if dedtictkrns are tern tilled
for all contributions by nonitemizers, in part because of those taxpayers who switch, and
that with a low enough floor, the incentive to hutch deductions rather than to give annu-
ally will not be a significant problem. See Cordes et al., supra note 14, at 4. Independent
Sector and the PricewaierhouseCoopers study come to dif recent conclusions on both these
points. See PRICEWATEKI IOUSECOOPERS, siipai note 76. at 4-5. Importantly, where Pri•ewa-
terhouseCoopers finds that the noniteinizer deduction without a floor Ivould increase
giving by $14.0 billion in the first year, the Urban Institute shows increases in giving •ang-
ing from about $2.3 billion to $8 billion, using 1915 income levels, depending on the level
of pri•'e sensitivity assumed. Compare MucEwATEnnoust:CooPERs, sup.a note 70, at 4, with
Cordes et ztl., supra note 14, al 4.
• a" Cordes et al., supra note 14, at 0.
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ductions,9° and the Clinton administration's nonitemizer proposals
included such a floor 91
 The current proposals do not. Exempt or-
ganizations supporting a charitable contribution deduction for non-
itemizers should consider, as a matter of tax policy, whether they
might not wish to support some kind of floor. Given both history and
policy, a floor like the one suggested by the Urban Institute study
might help ensure the longevity of a nonitemizer deduction, protect-
ing it against future repeal in the name of simplicity.92
3. Effect on Volunteering—Time vs. Money
In considering the nonitemizer deduction, charitable organiza-
tions will also have to ask themselves whether giving time and giving
money are substitutes or complements. Charitable organizations, par-
ticularly religious organizations, depend heavily on volunteers. Ac-
cording to Independent Sector's 1999 survey, the volunteer workforce
represented the equivalent of over nine million full-time employees at
a value of $225.9 billion.93 The survey found that frequency of atten-
dance at religious services influenced the proportion of those who
volunteered as well as those who gave.94
 Of those who volunteered,
55% said they learned about their volunteer activities at a religious
institution.95
 The connection between religion and volunteering is
not new. A 1981 Gallup Poll found that informal assistance and relig-
ious volunteering were among the most popular categories of volun-
teering.96
 Using data from the same time period, Burton A. Weisbrod
found that the value of volunteer labor to religious organizations was
over twice the amount paid as wages and salaries. 97
Under current law, taxpayers receive no deduction for the value
of the time they donate.98
 On the other hand, the value of their dune
is not included in income, and expenses incurred in volunteering,
"Stokeld, supra note 54. at 158.
91 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
92 See Cordes et al., supra note. 14, at 6.
93 INDEP. SECTOR, GirINC AND VOLUNTEERING, supra note 10. at Volunteering.
91 Id. at The Relationship Between Religious Involvement and Charitable Behavior.
95 Id. at Importance of the Ask. See generally Elizabeth J. Reid, Nonprofit Advocacy and Po-
litical Participation, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT 291
(Elizabeth T. Rods & C. Eugene Sienerle eds., 1999) (considering political activity of non-
profit organizations).
96 See CLOTFELTER, supra Hole 8, at 144.
97 WEIS BROD, supra note 8, at 203 (using Wages and salaries paid and data oil volun-
teering from 1980-1981).
98 See I.R.C. § 170.
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such as unreimbursed costs of transportation, telephone, etc., are de-
ductible. That is, the tax code permits a deduction for money or
property, but not for time. For those who itemize, Rich treatment is
neutral. Imagine a doctor who can earn $1,000 for a day's work. If the
doctor works for pay for five days and donates one day's earnings to a
charity, she will be able to deduct the $1,000 and have $4,000 of tax-
able income. If she instead works for pay for four days and donates
one day at a clinic, she will also have $4,000 of taxable income. The
charitable donation equalizes the decision between contributions of
time and contributions of money.
Currently, for those who do not itemize, the income tax is not
neutral. A nonitetnizer earning,$10 a hour at a 30% marginal tax rate
must choose between volunteering for an hour or working for an
hour, keeping $3 to pay the taxes on that additional hour and donat-
ing $7 to the charity If his volunteer labor is worth $10 per hour to
the charity, tax on the hour worked makes volunteering more advan-
tageous. Thus, the income tax system creates a distortion in favor of
gifts of time.
As such, charities in general and religious organizations in par-
ticular need to ask themselves whether a nonitemizer deduction
miglit reduce the volunteer labor they receive. Like econometric stud-
ies of price elasticity of giving, most studies of volunteer work are
problematic. Not all findings  are statistically significant, and many are
based on only one data set. A National Study of Philanthropy under-
taken by the Census Bureau and the University of Michigan's Survey
Research Center in the 1970s, had the most complete data set with
information on tax-related variables.° Those taxpayers on the border-
line' between itemizing and not itemizing, the same group problem-
atic in the Urban Institute study, were also a problem in these stud-
ies, 1 00 Nonetheless, studies of volunteer work seem to indicate that
giving cash and giving money are complements rather than substi-
tutes.. 101 The 1999 Independent Survey of Giving and Volunteering
offered further confirmation, although, in the report available on its
website, it did not report tax-related variables. 1 °2 The 1999 study
found that volunteers made larger financial contributions on average
99 See CLUTEF.t.TER, SU/M/1101C 8, al 163-70.
"" See id.
ioi See id. at 170.
lot See INI)EP, SEGI'012, GIVING ;ND \ rOLUNTEERIN(1, .s upra IlDle,10.
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than those who did not volunteer. 105
 Indeed, contributing households
with a volunteer consistently gave more than twice the percentage of
household income as households in which respondents did not volun-
teer. 10't Moreover, between 1995 and 1996, among those attending re-
ligious services weekly, there was an almost eight percent increase
(from 68% to over 75%) in those who reported volunteering, 'even
though there was a three percent decline in those giving to religious
organizations from 1995 to 1998. 105
Thus, so long as the 'discussion focuses on the efficiency of ex-
tending the charitable contribution deduction to nonitemizers, there
does not seem to be a lot of evidence to raise concern about its effect
on volunteering. As will be discussed below, however, the charitable
contribution deduction raises some equitable concerns; and some
responses to those concerns could have an impact on volunteering.
4. Moving from Dollar Efficiency to Economic Efficiency
As noted earlier, proponents justify the charitable contribution
deduction in terms of dollar efficiency, using an unusually narrow
definition of efficiency for purposes of tax policy. Generally, tax poli-
cymakers go further and look for economic efficiency. By economic
efficiency, they mean "maximizing the difference between social
benefits and social costs."106
 Economic efficiency asks how much citi-
zens benefit from foregone government revenue compared to alter-
native uses of that lost revenue. It asks who ultimately benefits from
the charitable contribution deduction. Independent Sector, for ex-
ample, in answering the question of why the charitable deduction
should he treated differently from other deductions for nonitemizers,
replied: "The charitable deduction is the only deduction that provides
no personal benefit to the contributor. Instead, Americans give to
charitable causes to strengthen their communities and to help the
needy. "107
 Sometimes, in the case of the charitable contribution de-
duction, this question takes a narrower form and asks whether the
"government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from
lua INDEP. SECTOR, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING„ supra note 10, at The Relati )))) ship Be-
tween Giving and Voltuiteering.
1114
 See id.
116 !NWT. SECTOR, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING, 311/na note 10, at The Relationship Be-
tween Religious Involvement and Charitable Behavior.
106 Fullerton & Gooduaan—supm note 67, at 1028.
1 ° 7
 Independent Sector. The Charitable Deduction 6n. Noldiemizers Q & A, a! 1 n 1110 /
www.intlependentsector.org/programs/gr/NCDFAQs.html
 (last visited Aug. 14. 2001).
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financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropria-
tions from public funds." 1 °8
When looking at the charitable deduction from the view of' eco-
nomic efficiency, some economists have questioned the charitable
deduction for churches. 1 °9 As Professor Mark P. Gergen explained,
from the viewpoint of economic efficiency, high price sensitivity is be-
side the point: "High elasticity suggests only that a deduction is a
source of significant revenue to churches. The efficiency of a deduc-
tion. depends on the relative magnitude of the cost of what is pur-
chased, and what is foregone because of the additional deducted con-
tribution. High elasticity is entirely consistent with waste."no
A 1972 estimate put Thonsacramentar expenditures, those for
social welfare, health functions, and nonreligious education," at less
than 20%, and available data indicate that "sacramental functions ac-
count for a preponderance of church expenditures." 111 That is, con-
tributions by members of churches primarily benefit other members.
A 2000 study by Independent Sector reported that of $9.6 billion in
donations by America's more than 350,000 religious congregations,
66% was distribitted within the denomination, 23% to organizations
outside the denomination, and 11% was given in direct assistance to
individuals. In the study, 40% of congregations described programs
addressing social needs as an important activity. 112 A 1999 survey with
a nationally representative sample of congregations reported that
57% participated in or supported social service projects of some
sort. 1 E 3 Spending on these projects, moreover, constituted on average
only between 2% and 4% of a congregation's total budget. 114
Thus, "one might speculate that the primary motive for giving to
religion is for the donor to provide himself [with] a spiritual club-
I'm See SEIDMAN, Silpra irate 22, at 17.
If"' See Mark P. Gergen, The Case far a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 VA. L. REV.
1393,139311.3 (1988).
u" Id. in 1439-40.
Ill CLO'I'FELTER, supra now 8, al 23-25.
111! See INDEP. SECTOR, ANIERICA'S RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS, supra nom 7, al 7.
Ill Mark (-laves, Congrfgations' Social Service Activities, in ClIARTING CIVIL SOCIETY 2
criw Urban NoOpMfils and Pillar mom', \Vasil., D.C. Dec. 1999), available al
hilp://www.urban.org/periodcl/clip/crip_Ci.pill. The snuly further reported that only a
very slindl minority of congregations adminisier their own projects in these areas mid only
12% have a staff person devoting at least 25% of his or her dine to social service projects.
See id.
11
. 1 See id.
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house." 115
 In this view, the deduction for contributions to churches
benefits the members of the church at the expense of nonmembers.
Even leaving aside Establishment Clause concerns, such contributions
do not provide services that would otherwise have to be provided by
the government. If given the choice, nonmembers might well prefer
the foregone revenue to be spent in other ways. With religious con-
gregations, "the issue ... may he described generally as whether a
club-like collective good which benefits and is supported by a small
and socially close group deserves the public support of not taxing its
members' contributions."'"
Many agree that our country urgently needs to encourage inqini-
tions that foster a community and a civil society. 117
 Iii fact, the tax
code exempts a variety of institutions that achieve this end, such as
social welfare organizations under section 501 (c) (4), social clubs un-
der section 501(c)(7), or fraternal organizations under section
501(c) (8). These organizations, however, are not allowed the double
benefit of tax exemption and receiving tax-deductible contribu-
tions.'"
Of course, many believe that the moral education received by
members from their churches benefits society as a whole. Churches
provide a "spillover" benefit to the entire community. Such benefit,
however, may not require the incentive of a charitable contribution
deduction. Again, to quote Professor Gergen, "[r]eligious education
is the sort of thing we would expect parents and church members to
provide on their own." 119
 It should be worth the price and not require
nonmembers to pay for it through the charitable contribution deduc-
tion in order to provide the optimal level of such education.'"
Churches, moreover, are enormously successful in obtaining contri-
butions from their members, as the recent survey data show, even
115
 Mark A. Hall & John I). Columbo, The Donative Theory of the Clmrilable Tax ExeinPlloo,
52 Oily)	 L.J. 1379,1401 (1991).
116 Ccrgen, SUM note 109, at 1433-34.
117 See generally RonERT D. PuTrq,ukt, BOWLING ALONE: TILE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL of
AMERICAN Commorrrry (2000).
ua For example, section 170(c) (4) permits a cliarbable contribution for gills to frater-
nal associations operating under the lodge system "only if such contribution or gill is 10 be
used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary. or educational purposes, or for
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals." I.R.C. § 170(c) (4).
119
 Gergen, supra note 109, at 1437.
1 " linked, under current law, tuition paid for giving one's own children a religions
education is not deductible as a charitable contrilintion. See Sklar v. CIR, 79 T.C.M. (CM)
1815,1815 (2000).
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though many of their members currently do not enjoy the benefit of
an income tax deduction. 121
In sum, efficiency arguments, whether of dollar efficiency or
economic efficiency, do not unequivocally support a charitable con-
triblition deduction in general or for churches in particular. Since
churches are likely to be the major benefactor of a nonitemizer de-
duction, such analyses urge caution in their extension, particularly
when administrative concerns are also considered.
Equity concerns must be considered as well, As discussed further
below, questions of distribution and redistribution, which were raised
above in connection with economic efficiency, figure as well in con-
siderations of equity.
B. Allowing Nonitemizers to Deduct Is Only Fair—The Argument from Equity
'"Fairness" arguments, when applied to the charitable contribu-
tion deduction, involve three quite different considerations: the com-
parison of itemizers and nonitemizers, the rationale for excluding
charitable contributions from income, and the impact of the charita-
ble contribution deduction on progressivity. As with the arguments
from efficiency, the equitable arguments do not unambiguously sup-
port extending the charitable contribution deduction to nonitemiz-
ers.
1. Equal Treatment of Itemizers and Nonitemizers
"Shouldn't all Americans," asks Independent Sector, "itemizers
and nonitemizers alike, receive a tax deduction for charitable gifts?"
The, group's answer: "It's only fair."122 The argument is one of hori-
zontal equity—that itemizers and nonitemizers are similarly situated
and should be treated similarly.
While this argument has superficial appeal, it does not withstand
scrutiny. Many nonitemizers, like itemizers, owe state income taxes,
incur medical costs, have unreinibursed employee expenses, and pay
a mortgage on their home. They could itemize these costs as deduc-
tion; , but do not. Nonitemizers have decided that it is in their eco-
nomic interest to use the standard deduction.
121 supra notes 7-12 mid accompanying Rim,
122 Independent Sector, Public Policy, Notiiitintizer Charitable 1)educi ion, at liit1):/ /
Nvww.indepeildentseciunorg/prugranis/gr/Noniteinizer_Decluclion,litnil (last visited Aug.
14, 2001).
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The purpose of the standard deduction, as discussed earlier, has
always been to provide tax simplification for those Americans who
choose to use it. As the legislative history shows, from its inception the
level of the standard deduction was set to take charitable giving into
account. The standard deduction is sufficient "to provide most tax-
payers with a larger deduction than they would be able to claim by
itemizing medical and work expenses, state and local taxes, charitable
contributions, and other uses of income." 123
 Thus, to permit nonitem-
izers to deduct all charitable contributions, without a floor or some
adjustment to the standard deduction, would give these taxpayer;, in
effect, a double deduction and put them in a position better ihan
rather than equal to itemizers. 124
 Equity, like efficiency, requires some
kind of floor beneath nonitemizer deductions. Alternatively, the stan-
dard deduction might be lowered by the estimated average charitable
contribution by noniteinizers.
2. Deductions as Inequitable to Lower-Income Taxpayers
Even if the tax code permitted both itemizers and nonitemizers
to deduct charitable contributions, an important inequity would re-
main. Income tax deductions are worth more to those with higher
taxable incomes and therefore higher marginal rates of tax, and the
"philosopher-economist might observe that the opportunity cost of
virtue falls as one moves up the income scale." 25
 Another economist
has noted that the present system of deductible contributions results
in a "serious plutocratic bias to the activities of privately supported
philanthropic, educational, and religious institutions." 126 Clotfelter
observes that eliminating the charitable contribution deduction
would increase the progressivity of the income tax. 127
The impact of the charitable contribution deduction should be
of particular concern to religious congregations, both because many
espouse a moral belief in equality of all and because this system favors
the charitable activities favored by the wealthy. The wealthy favor cul-
123 Cordes at al., supra note 14, at 1.
124
 In 11197 David Arons of Independent Sector supported a floor for nonitentib:r de-
ductions so that people did not have "a double (lip or a double reward." See Stokeld, supra
note 54, al 158.
125 RICHARD A. IsluscstAvE PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRAc•icE 362 (3rd ed. 1980).
126 ‘VILIAAM VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 131 (1947); see also burr-
FELTER, salon Dole 8, at 287.
127 CLOTFELTER,
	 DOW 8, at 286,
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tural institutions and institutions of higher learning instead of relig-
ious and social welfare organizations.
For both interested and disinterested reasons, then, religious
congregations might want to consider supporting a charitable contri-
bution credit for all taxpayers rather than extending the charitable
contribution deduction to nonitemizers. Unlike a deduction, a credit
saves taxpayers the same amount of tax regardless of tax rate. 128 Many
have called for replacing the deduction with a credit. 129 Of course, a
credit instead of a deduction itself raises many difficult questions. if
higher income taxpayers are more price sensitive than other taxpay-
ers, substituting a charitable contribution credit for the deduction
might decrease overall giving. Since the relationship between giving
time and money is also uncertain, substituting a credit for a deduction
might also impact volunteering, Currently, the lack of a charitable
contribution deduction for nonite ► izers produces a bias in favor of
giving time. A deduction for all charitable contributions is neutral be-
tween giving time and money. A tax credit for charitable contributions
could produce a bias in favor of giving money instead of time. Addi-
tionally, even a credit will not help taxpayers with incomes so low that
they owe no income taxes, unless the credit is refundable. 13°
Comparing the effect of a deduction and a credit, however,
should remind religious organizations that extending the charitable
contribution deduction to no ► itemizers does not completely level the
playing field between higher and lower income taxpayers. It should
give churches and other religious organizations pause before support-
ing the current versions of the legislation.
3. Defining the Tax Base
A quite different version of the "It's Not Fair" argument is that
the income tax is based on the taxpayer's ability to pay, which in turn
121 To illustrate, a deduction for a $100 charitable contribution saves a taxpayer $15 at
the 15% tax rate, hilt saves $35 for a taxpayer in a 35% bracket. If instead each got a credit
for 25% of contribution, both would save $25 in taxes, Styr Todd 'no, Comment, A
Full Spectrum of Light: Rethinking the Charitable Contribution Dednaion, 141 U. PA. L. Rev.
2371, 2372 (1993).
1 " See flarokk M. Hochman es: James D. Rodgers, The Optimal Tax "Treatment of Charitable
Contributions, in The ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INsTrr•rioNs: STUDIES IN STRUCTURE
AND POLICY 238, 243 11.29 (Susan Rose Ackerman ed., 1986).
I " Those with Ilse lowest incomes acctnint fin• a high percentage of giving and house-
holds at either end of the scale, under $10,000 ;Ind over $100,000, gave most as a percent-
age of total household income. Sec INI -WP. SECTOR, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING, sn/n a note
1(1, at Key Findings.
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is measured by savings and consumption; thus, money given to charity
does not belong in the tax base. Under this view, charitable gifts must
be deducted to arrive at the proper base upon which to impose the
income tax. With this argument, a tax credit is not an option, and the
charitable contribution deduction, by definition, needs to apply to
both itemizers and nonitemizers. The Joint Committee on Taxation
nicely summarizes this rationale: "Income given to a charity should
not be taxed because it does not enrich the giver. Or, stated differ-
ently, the charitable contribution deduction reduces the taxpayer's
ability to pay income tax." 131
Under this view, the charitable contribution deduction differs
from most other itemized deductions, such as those for mortgage in-
terest or even medical expenses and casualty losses, because they are
not personal. It is viewed like state and local income taxes, for which a
deduction is also permitted, as enhancing the public good. 132
The flaw many find with this analysis is that charitable contribu-
tions are made voluntarily, as a discretionary use of income. As a per-
sonal expenditure, it would be a form of consumption and properly
part of the income tax base. Independent Sector's own data support
this characterization. Its 1999 Survey of Giving and Volunteering in-
cluded a finding that the "decision to give is influenced by whether
individuals have sufficient disposable income." 33
The support for, and the evidence, however mixed, of the incen-
tive effect of the charitable deduction also undermine the equitable
argument that charitable contributions should be not part of the base
for imposing the income tax because charitable contributions do not
represent a form of personal consumption. That contributions re-
spond to incentives by exhibiting at least some price elasticity show
that they are discretionary and represent personal expenditures:
The notion that contributions to charities do not represent per-
sonal use or consumption is particularly difficult to sustain for relig-
ious congregations, because, as discussed above, donations to relig-
ious congregations stay within the congregation) 34
 Although some
redistribution within congregations occurs, with the top 10% of relig-
" JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, PRESENT LAW AND PROPOSALS, ,Supra note 6, at 12. Many as-
sociate this view of charitable contributions with William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in
an Ideal Income Tax, 86 flAttv. L. REv, 309,309 (1972).
02 See Brody 8.: Cordes. .supra Dote 69, at 153-54.
193 INDEP. SECTOR, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING, Stfpra note 10, at Economic Conditions
and Chartiable Behavior.
1 : 11 See t1 PM notes 109-114 and acronym tying text.
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ious donors accounting for over 25% of the amounts given, the redis-
tributive effect is more pronounced in other charities. 135 Moreover, in
some studies, contributions to religious organizations show high elas-
ticity (that is, are very sensitive to price), which suggests that these
donations are discretionary and therefore properly part of an income
tax base. 136
Thus, a variety of equitable arguments also produce questions
about the policy choice of extending the charitable contribution de-
duction to nonitemizers. These concerns lead to very different re-
spouses. Consideration of the level at which the standard deduction is
set suggests retaining the status quo or reducing the current level of
the standard deduction of nonitemizers. The regressive effect of the
current deduction might argue for replacing the deduction with a
charitable contribution credit. Some definitions of the tax base would
call for eliminating the charitable contribution deduction either alto-
gether or perhaps only for religious institutions.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has been to show that the arguments
in favor of extending the charitable contribution to nonitemizers, a
change that would benefit religious organizations in particular, is not
as simple as proponents have made it seem. Neither the arguments
from efficiency nor those from equity unambiguously support this ex-
tension. At the very least, issues raised under both sets of arguments
suggest changes in the structure of the federal tax benefit given to
charitable contributions. Religious congregations, for example, need
to ask themselves whether they might wish to support a charitable
contribution credit instead of either a deduction or a charitable con-
tribution deduction only above a floor.
hi fact, that members of religious institutions contribute in order
to benefit themselves permits an argument that no contributions to
these institutions should be deductible. I ant not suggesting that there
is any likelihood of such result nor arguing that there should be. Al-
though neither the efficiency nor equity arguments standing alone
clearly support these deductions, either for charities in general or for
" 5 See Gergetl, supra note 109, at 1441. For educational institutions. the top one-tenth
of mac percent of &mots accounts COI' over 25% of the ninth ults given. See id.
l ' t) Nonetheless, even Professor Geiger argues that the equity argument for deducting
religious contrilmtions is stronger than the efficiency argument because such gills are
"self-abnegating," given in good measure out of obligation and commitment rather than
payment lOr services received. Gergcn. supra note 109, at 1442.
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religious congregations in particular, it may well be that the two ap-
proaches combined do. Thus, religious institutions provide needed
community, moral and ethical education, and attract donations not
only for the donor's own benefit, but also for that of future genera-
tions. For all forms of charities, it seems, the political support that
the deduction has enjoyed over the years is clue in large part to the
combined appeal of these quite different justifications." 137
Moreover, although I have focused on religious organizations,
much of the criticism made of religious organizations is equally appli-
cable to other recipients of the charitable contribution deduction. It
is far from clear that gifts favored by the wealthy have any greater re-
distributive component than those, such as religious institutions, fa-
vored by the less wealthy. 138
 Our society has not limited the organiza-
tions eligible to receive tax-deductible donations to those who aid the
needy or relieve the burdens of government. The organizations and
activities for which the tax laws permit a charitable contribution de-
duction have never been a neat set necessarily capable of one clear-
°it set of justifications. History and tradition have as much to do with
the set of charitable organizations entitled to receive deductible con-
tributions as do notions of efficiency and equity. 139
 Thus, theories of
CLOTFELTER, supra note 8, at 101 (describing George Break, Charitable Contributions
Under The Federal Individual Inwow Tax: Alternative Polity Options, in RESEARCH PAPERS. VOL-
UME	 BEHAVIORAL. STUDIES, FOUNDATIONS, AND CORPORATIONS 1523 (Comm'n
on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, I)eT'[ (tithe Treasury 1977)).
138
 See CLoTrELTER, supra note 8, at 287.
1" Consider the bunons 1601 .
 Statute of Charitable Uses. Its preamble lists all of the
following as chatty:0)1e parpttses Ii which property has been given:
1S1onte for relief of aged, impotent and poor people, some for maintenance,
of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, flee schools,'
and scholars in universities. some for repair of bridges, ports, havens, cause-
ways, churches, sea-banks and highways, sonic for education and preferntem
of orphans, some for or toward relief, stock, or maintenance for houses of
correction, some for marriages of poor maids, sonic for st pportation, aid and
help of young tradesman, handicraftsmen and persons decayed, and others
for relief or redemption of prisoners or captives, and for aid or ease of any
poor inhabitants concerning payments of fifteens, setting out of soldiers, and
other taxes.
The Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Elie.. c. 4, quoted in AUSTIN WAKEMAN Sena-'
WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, LW' OF TRUSTS § 368.1 (4th ed. 1987). The authors com-
ment, "1dt is interesting to note that the only mention of religion is the repair of
(inn-cites, and yet it soon was held by the cowls thin the promotion of religion. or at least
what was regarded as the proper religion, is charitable." Scorr & FRATCHER, supra, § 368.1.
They also observe that the tendency of courts through the ages has been to enlarge the
scope of charitable purposes. See id.
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equity and efficiency may need to be supplemented by other ap-
proa.ches. 140
Further, it may well be that a tax subsidy through a tax deduction
or a tax for religious organizations stands on different ground from
those for other kinds of charities. Economists Harold M. Hochman
and James D. Rogers, for example, make this distinction: "External
benefits must accrue in the deinands for the specific services that
charity finances or through prior constitutional choice, as with relig-
ious activities, to justify the public subsidization of charity."Fn For
other charitable activities—he they health care, educational, or cul-
tural activities—it is appropriate both to treat the lost revenue from
the deduction as analogous to direct outlay programs and to ask the
extent to which the activities financed by contributions relieve gov-
ernment of burdens that would otherwise be satisfied by public funds.
Direct provision by government is not available as an alternative for
religious activities. A tax deduction or credit ingeniously satisfies the
values of both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the
First Anienchnent.
At the same time, it is of the utmost importance for religious or-
ganizations to remember that government policymakers have viewed
the charitable contribution deduction from its beginning as an incen-
tive and a subsidy, albeit an indirect subsidy. As recipients of such gov-
erinnent largesse, religious congregations should remember to think
carefully about their role in and responsibility to American society,
including support for good government policy. Congress has limited,
not prohibited, the ability of religious congregations to lobby. They
can and should work to promote good policy, even if good tax policy
means limitations on tax provisions that benefit them directly.
149 See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the amity Tax Exemption,
23 J. or Com.. L. 585, 587-96 (1998) (arguing for a theory of sovereignty for exemption);
ball & Coluntbo, supra note 115, at 1383-84 (argtting fur a donative theory for exemp-
tion). Arguments regarding the justification for exempting an organization under section
501(e) (3) are closely related to arguments regarding the justification for permittilig chari-
table 17ontrilmtion deductions.
HI Hochman & Rodgers, supra note 129, at 227.
